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A SECURITIES LAWYER'S DILEMMA: THE
SEC'S POLICY OF DISCLOSURE V. THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
This Comment discusses the importance of the attorney-
client privilege to the securities lawyer and possible infringe-
ments on the privilege by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission. The significance of a settlement in the controversial
National Student Marketing case is examined. The Comment
also analyzes the basis for the American Bar Association's
support for the attorney-client privilege and the rationale for
the SEC's disclosure policy. The author concludes that the
attorney-client privilege for the corporation is endangered
by present disclosure policies and offers suggestions for at-
torney conduct under the existing state of the law.
The attorney-client privilege is one of the most sacred and funda-
mental rules of evidence. An attorney is not permitted, and cannot be
compelled, to testify about communications made to him in his pro-
fessional capacity by his client unless the client consents.' The attor-
ney-client privilege is based on the importance of encouraging full
disclosure by the client. The client will be more willing to reveal all
the facts if he knows that the disclosure will be kept in strict confi-
dence. The privilege is as important to corporations as it is to indi-
viduals.' The corporation's attorney-client privilege has been upheld
in a stockholder suit subject to a showing of good cause.3 The avail-
ability of the privilege to corporate clients has been directly recog-
nized in most jurisdictions.4
The Code of Professional Responsibility supports an attorney-
client privilege for the corporation. Canon Four provides: "A lawyer
1. 58 Am. JuR. Witnesses § 460 (1948).
2. American Cyanamid v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85 (D. Del.
1962). But see Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771
(N.D. Ill. 1962).
3. E.g., Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
101 U.S. 974 (1971).
4. United States v. Becton & Co., 212 F. Supp. 92 (D.N.J. 1962); City of
Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962); A.B.
Dick Co. v. Marr, 95 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), appeal dismissed, 197 F.2d 498
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 878 (1952).
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should preserve the confidences and secrets of a client."5 The attor-
ney owes a duty of confidentiality to the corporate client.6 However,
the disciplinary rules provide that an attorney may reveal the confi-
dences or secrets of a client when permitted or required by law7 and
prohibit an attorney from knowingly assisting his client in illegal or
fraudulent activity.8 The American Bar Association's support of the
attorney-client privilege and the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion's (SEC) policy of disclosure have been the basis of "an estrange-
ment, an interruption of this process [effective communication be-
tween the Bar and the Commission], the introduction of static on that
line of communication between the Bar and the Commission."9
THE NATIONAL STUDENT M/ARKETIG LITIGATION
A case which may create an exception to the attorney-client
privilege for corporations is SEC v. National Student Marketing
Corp.10 This litigation has spawned several court decisions"
and has received considerable attention from commentators.'2
The case reflects a new role for securities lawyers and a new SEC
policy in enforcing this role.
National Student Marketing Corporation (NSMC) sought to merge
with Interstate National Corporation (Interstate). Defendant White
& Case, a New York City law firm, was NSMC's outside legal adviser;
Marion Jay Epley III was a partner in this firm. Interstate was
represented by defendant Bissell & Brook, a Chicago law firm, of
which Louis Schauer was a member. Interstate hired an investment
banking firm to make an investigation into the background, history,
and finances of NSMC prior to the merger.
5. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 4 (1971).
6. Daley & Karmel, Attorneys' Responsibilities: Adversaries at the Bar of
the SEC, 24 EMORY L.J. 747 (1975).
7. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 4-101(C).
8. Id., DR 7-102 (A)(7).
9. Address by SEC Commissioner A.A. Sommers, Jr., The Commission and
the Bar: Forty Good Years, Annual Luncheon of ABA Section of Corporation,
Banking and Business Law, Honolulu, Hawaii (Aug. 14, 1974), reprinted in
Mathews, Liabilities of Lawyers Under the Federal Securities Laws, 30 Bus.
LAW. 105, 119 (spec. issue Mar., 1975) (brackets original).
10. 360 F. Supp. 284 (D.D.C. 1973).
11. See generally authorities cited notes 15-19 infra.
12. See, e.g., Freeman, Opinion Letters and Professionalism, 1973 DUKE L.J.
371; Johnson, The Expanding Responsibilities of Attorneys in Practice Before
the SEC: Disciplinary Proceedings Under Rule 2(e) of the Commission's Rules
of Practice, 25 MERCER L. REV. 637 (1974); Karmel, Attorneys' Securities Laws
Liabilities, 27 Bus. LAw. 1153 (1972); Koch, Attorney's Liability: The Securities
Bar and the Impact of National Student Marketing, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 883
(1973); Lipman, The SEC's Reluctant Police Force: A New Role for Lawyers, 49
N.Y.U. L. REv. 437 (1974); Shipman, The Need for SEC Rules to Govern the
Duties and Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Statutes, 34 OHIO ST.
L,J. 231 (1973).
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Upon receipt of a favorable report, the corporations decided to
proceed with the merger. A signed merger agreement between the
corporations required receipt by each company of a comfort letter
from the independent public accountants for the other company.13
The comfort letter was to state that the accountants had no reason to
believe that the unaudited interim financial statements contained in
the NSMC proxy statement were not prepared in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles and that they did not re-
quire any material adjustments. An opinion letter from counsel for
each company stated that all transactions in connection with the
merger had been conducted in full compliance with applicable law.
The closing meeting took place at the office of White & Case in
New York City. In attendance were representatives of NSMC; Inter-
state directors; Schauer, representing Lord, Bissell & Brook for In-
terstate; and Epley, on behalf of White & Case, which represented
NSMC. The accountants for NSMC were to deliver the comfort letter
to NSMC's attorneys on closing day. However, by telephone, the
accountants advised Epley that certain errors existed in NSMC's
prior statements of net income. If corrected, NSMC's net income
would be stated at a slight loss rather than at the $700,000 profit
reflected in the proxy material sent to Interstate shareholders for
merger approval. A description of the required adjustments was
distributed to the representatives of Interstate at the closing meeting
prior to consummation of the merger agreement. The description of
the required adjustment did not include what the ultimate effect of
the change would be in the financial statement.
The accountants for NSMC drafted another paragraph to be added
to the comfort letter to explain the effect of the adjustments. This
modification was communicated to NSMC's attorneys but was not
disclosed to the Interstate directors. NSMC's attorneys told the ac-
countants that the addition required to determine the ultimate effect
of the adjustments was not important because anyone could do the
arithmetic.
The Interstate representatives decided to proceed with the closing
without a board meeting and without giving notice to their share-
holders of the adjustments or resoliciting their approval for the
merger. Subsequent to the closing, the Interstate directors received a
13. A comfort letter is a written memorandum by an accountant which states
that there is no reason to believe the corporation's financial statements were not
prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.
full text of the comfort letter from the accountants but declined to
take further action. The adjustments contained in the comfort letter
were never disclosed to the public or to the stockholders.
The SEC instituted an injunctive action after investigating the
transaction. The SEC alleged that the omissions were material and in
furtherance of a fraudulent scheme which violated the securities
laws. 14 The gravamen of the SEC charges against the attorney de-
fendants concerning the closing meeting was that they had failed to
issue their opinions and to insist that the financial statements be
revised and the shareholders be resolicited. Should the parties have
refused this advice, the SEC would impose a duty on the attorneys to
disclose the misleading nature of the financial statement to the SEC.
White & Case and Epley were also charged with continuing to con-
ceal the fraud by failure to refer to the comfort letter in a report to
the SEC.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the attorneys
serving in their representative capacity could be held accountable
under the securities laws. The court dismissed the defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment because the attorney's 13 state of mind in
violating the securities laws was a question of fact. The court thus
appeared to require some level of scienter before an injunction would
issue.
In March, 1975, White & Case and Epley sought production of
documents 5 which had been submitted by the SEC for in camera
review by the court.' 6 At the same time, the SEC filed a motion to
dismiss the attorney's defense, which was based on an SEC violation
of its own rules in failing to advise defendants of their potential
liability and of their right to present views to the SEC. The court
denied the attorney defendant's request for production of docu-
ments, holding that the documents were protected by the privilege
for internal governmental memoranda containing advice or opin-
ions.17 Furthermore, the court ruled that the defendant's defense was
insufficient as a matter of law because the SEC's directive to the staff
14. The SEC alleged violations and aiding and abetting in violations of the
antifraud, proxy, and reporting sections of the securities laws. See 15 U.S.C. §§
77q(a), 78j(b), 78m(a) (1976).
15. White & Case and Epley sought production of documents relating to the
promulgation of the SEC directive concerning notification of defendants, possi-
ble notification of the defendants in this case, inquiries from people outside the
SEC concerning pre-proceeding notification, recommendations of the Advi.
sory Committee on Enforcement Policies and Practices of the SEC (Wells
Committee), and discussions of the Securities Act Release No. 5310 (Procedures
Relating to the Commencement of Enforcement Proceedings and Termina-
tion of Staff Investigations). SEC v. National Student Mktng. Corp., 68 F.R.D.
157 (D.D.C. 1975).
16. Id.
17. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(5) (1976).
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was only a suggestion that, if available, opposing viewpoints be made
known to the SEC. White & Case and Epley were forced to develop a
different line of defense.
In June, 1976, the SEC received a setback in the investigation of
NSMC. Epley, the co-defendant partner of White & Case, testified
before a federal grand jury in connection with an investigation into
the affairs of NSMC. Epley was not indicted but gave considerable
testimony to the grand jury. The SEC applied for an order authoriz-
ing disclosure of Epley's grand jury testimony to refresh his memory
in the pending civil litigation.18 The court held that the grand jury
was not an investigative tool at the disposal of the SEC and that it
would be an abuse of the grand jury process to allow its work prod-
uct to be funneled to other governmental agencies having an interest
in the subject. Because the SEC failed to show a particularized need
which would outweigh the policy of secrecy, the request for disclo-
sure was denied the SEC.19
A full hearing on the merits of the SEC claim against White & Case
and Epley was scheduled for 1977. In its pretrial brief, the SEC
contended that White & Case and Epley were negligent in preparing
false opinions and in associating themselves with materially false
and misleading statements.20 The SEC argued that negligence was
sufficient for the requested injunction. Even if scienter were re-
quired, the SEC would contend that the attorney's gross negligence
satisfied this requirement, as the attorneys should have known that
their acts would result in violations of the federal securities laws. The
SEC stated that the need for an injunction is even greater when the
defendants contend that their activities were legitimate.
White & Case and Epley argued in their pretrial brief that they
acted in accordance with their legal and ethical duties and that there
was no evidence that they had any knowledge that any of the parties
18. In re Grand Jury Investig'n, 414 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
19. Several related actions followed the filing of the initial suit. NSMC stock-
holders were excluded as plaintiffs from a class action against the defendants.
In re National Student Mktng. Litig'n v. Barnes, 530 F.2d 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
Several Interstate stockholders were joined as defendants and ordered to an-
swer the complaint. In re National Student Mktng. Litig'n, 413 F. Supp. 1156
(D.D.C. 1976). Interstate National Corporation Employees Retirement Fund's
motion to dismiss was denied because it could be sued directly, not just through
a trustee. In re National Student Mktng. Litig'n, 413 F. Supp. 1159 (D.D.C. 1976).
20. SEC v. National Student Mktng. Corp., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,784 (D.D.C. 1976).
were engaging in unlawful activities.2' According to the defendants,
they had neither the right nor the duty to substitute their judgment
for what Interstate thought should be disclosed. The attorneys main-
tained that there was no basis for imposing a duty on lawyers to
disclose to the SEC under these circumstances. They argued that the
added paragraphs explaining the effects of the adjustment were not
material and imposed no duty to disclose at the closing meeting,
Finally, the defendants stated that to hold their assertion of inno-
cence as a basis for imposing the injunction violated equitable prin-
ciples.
In May, 1977, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia approved a proposed settlement of the SEC's case against
White & Case and Epley. 22 The terms of the settlement are important
in determining the new role of the securities lawyer and the SEC's
policy of disclosure. Epley consented to the entry of a final judgment
of permanent injunction which prohibited him from engaging in
future violations of the securities laws. Epley also agreed not to
practice before the SEC for 180 days from the date of the entry of the
judgment. The SEC agreed that it would not institute any proceed-
ings against Epley under Rule 2(e) of the Commission Rules of Prac-
tice based upon the judgment.23
The settlement with respect to White & Case involved a stipula-
tion of settlement. No injunction was issued against White & Case.
Rather, the firm consented to an order without admitting or denying
the allegations in the SEC complaint. By the terms of the order,
White & Case agreed not to aid and abet any securities violations in
its future representation of NSMC. White & Case further agreed that
it would undertake to adopt, to effectuate, and to maintain certain
procedures in its representation of all clients in matters involving the
federal securities laws. The SEC, in turn, agreed not to institute any
proceedings against White & Case under Rule 2(e) of the Commission
Rules of Practice based on the allegations.
21. SEC v. National Student Mktng. Corp., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCI) 95,912 (D.D.C. 1977).
22. SEC v. National Student Mktng. Corp., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,027 (D.D.C. 1977).
23. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(3)(A)-(B) (1977) provides for the suspension of an attor-
ney from appearing or practicing before the SEC if the attorney has been by
name:
(A) permanently enjoined by any court of competent jurisdiction by
reason of his misconduct in an action by the Commission from violation
or aiding and abetting the violation of any provision of the federal
securities laws or the rules and regulations thereunder; or
(B) Found by any court of competent jurisdiction in an action brought
by the Commission to which he is a party or found by this Commission
in any administrative proceeding to which he is a party to have violated
or aided and abetted the violation of any provision of the federal securi-
ties laws . . . or of the rules and regulations thereunder (unless the
violation was found not to have been willful).
Id. (parenthetical original).
802
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Under the terms of this settlement, the SEC imposed disclosure by
attorneys of information which may fall within the protection af-
forded by the attorney-client privilege. In the settlement, White &
Case and Epley agreed to make certain information relating to
NSMC available for any and all purposes at the request of any party
to the action. Such a disclosure requirement could have far-reaching
effects on the attorney-client privilege.
THE SEC POLICY OF DIsCLosURE
Several basic premises underlie the SEC's imposition of a duty on a
lawyer to disclose client conduct. The SEC first points to the indis-
pensable role of the attorney in the administration of the securities
laws.24 Because of this role, the attorney owes a high responsibility to
the investing public in disclosure matters.25 The SEC apparently
believes that the duty owed to the investing public takes precedence
over the attorney's obligation to the client to preserve confidences of
the client.26
The SEC supports this position by distinguishing between the
lawyer's roles as an advisor and as an advocate. The SEC argues that
the securities lawyer does not act in an adversarial role.27 As an
advisor, the securities lawyer is arguably not bound by the attorney-
client privilege and could fulfill his professional responsibility to the
investing public by disclosing communications with the client. There
is a possible waiver of the attorney-client privilege when the corpo-
ration authorizes the transmission of a document to the SEC.2 8
24. Statement by SEC Commissioner P. A. Loomis, Jr., 1971 Securities Regu-
lation Seminar 225-56 (Practicing Law Institute's Transcript Series No. 3, 1972),
reprinted in Lowenfels, Expanding Public Responsibilities of Securities Law-
yers: An Analysis of the New Trend in Standard of Care and Priorities of
Duties, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 412, 425 (1974).
25. Address by SEC Commissioner A.A. Sommers, Jr., The Commissioner
and the Bar: Forty Good Years, Annual Luncheon of ABA Section of Corpora-
tion, Banking and Business Law, Honolulu, Hawaii (Aug. 14, 1974), reprinted in
Mathews, Liabilities of Lawyers Under the Federal Securities Laws, 30 Bus.
LAW. 105, 119 (spec. issue Mar., 1975).
26. Lowenfels, Expanding Public Responsibilities of Securities Lawyers: An
Analysis of the New Trend in Standard of Care and Priorities of Duties, 74
COLUM. L. REV. 412 (1974).
27. In re Emanuel Fields, [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
79,407 (1973).
28. Goldberg, Policing Responsibilities of the Securities Bar: The Attor-
ney-Client Relationship and the Code of Professional Responsibility-Con-
siderations for Expertizing Securities Attorneys, 19 N.Y. L.F. 221 (1973).
It has also been suggested that the attorney should function morE
as an auditor, developing a healthy skepticism of the representationss
of management.2 9 This position would force the attorney to investi-
gate his own client, disclosing any material information found in the
investigation."0 One commentator has stated that the securities law-
yer does not have a client but is the attorney to "the situation." 31
The SEC has cited its small staff and limited resources as an
additional reason for imposing a rigorous duty of disclosure on the
securities lawyer.3 2 The SEC intends to enforce this duty through
injunctive actions, Rule 2(e) disbarment proceedings, and settle-
ments. 3 The attorney's role is so critical in securities transactions
that if he is deterred from aiding in securities violations and discloses
information to the SEC, the overall effect will be to reduce fraud in
the securities market.
The SEC's policy of disclosure is graphically illustrated in the
NSMC litigation.34 According to the SEC, the attorneys for NSMC
and Interstate should have disclosed the contents of the "comfort
letter" to NSMC and Interstate shareholders as well as to the invest-
ing public.3 5 The attorneys should have insisted that the financial
statement be revised and that Interstate's shareholders be resol-
icited.36 Moreover, the SEC contended that the lawyers should have
refused to issue their opinions, which were a condition to the clos-
ing.3 7 If the clients had refused to revise the financial statements and
29. Address by SEC Commissioner A.A. Sommers, Jr., The Emerging Re-
sponsibilities of the Securities Lawyers, before the Banking, Corporation and
Business Law Section of the New York State Bar Association (Jan. 24, 1974),
reprinted in Mathews, Liabilities of Lawyers Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 30 Bus. LAW. 105, 117 (spec. issue Mar., 1975).
30. Address by Former SEC Chairman W. J. Casey, 4 CORPORATION
COUNSEL'S LAW AND TAx REPORT & THE CORPORATE SECRETARY'S REPORT (Nov.
1, 1971), quoted in Lowenfels, Expanding Public Responsibilities of Securities
Lawyers: An Analysis of the New Trend in Standard of Care and Priorities of
Duties, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 412, 426 (1974).
31. Shipman, The Need for SEC Rules to Govern the Duties and Civil
Liabilities of Attorneys Under the Federal Securities Statutes, 34 OHIO ST. L.J.
231, 257 (1973).
32. In re Emanuel Fields, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5404 [1973 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEac. L. REP. (CCH) 79,407 (1973).
33. Address by SEC Chairman R. Garrett, Jr., Professional Responsibility
and the Securities Laws, before the State Bar of Texas (July 4, 1974), reprinted
in Mathews, Liabilities of Lawyers Under the Federal Securities Laws, 30 Bus.
LAW. 105, 118 (spec. issue Mar., 1975).
34. SEC v. National Student Mktng. Corp., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 9 95,784 (D.D.C. 1976); SEC v. National Student Mktng. Corp.,
[1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 9 93,360 (D.D.C. 1972).
35. SEC v. National Student Mktng. Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder) FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 93,360 (D.D.C. 1972).
36. Id.
37. Id.
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to resolicit the shareholders, the lawyers should have ceased repre-
senting the corporation.3" Finally, the SEC asserted that the attor-
neys should have brought the matter to the attention of the stockhol-
ders or the Commission.39 This final assertion by the SEC presents its
view that the attorney's responsibility to the investing public super-
cedes the duty owed to the client.
The settlement between the NSMC attorneys and the SEC repre-
sents possible infringements on the attorney-client privilege. White
& Case and Epley stipulated that they would make themselves and
their books, records, documents, correspondence, and other papers
relating to NSMC available for any and all purposes connected with
the action at the request of any party to the action.40 Some of this
information could fall within the attorney-client privilege. The attor-
ney-client privilege runs to the benefit of the corporation, not the
attorney;4' only the corporation may waive the privilege. 4
2
The dilemma of the securities lawyer under the SEC disclosure
policy is clear. The attorney may disclose the confidential communi-
cation and avoid SEC disbarment proceedings. However, this may
subject him to a suit by the client for malpractice in breaching a
confidence. The securities lawyer's alternative is to preserve the
confidences and to refuse to disclose. Such a decision may subject the
attorney to a disbarment or an injunctive action brought by the SEC.
The procedures agreed to by White & Case in representing future
clients evinces a new development. A committee of partners of White
& Case must review and approve prospective corporate clients who
are registered under the federal securities laws.43 If the committee
finds that prior counsel of a prospective client withdrew his repre-
sentation, a duty arises to investigate the reasons for the prior
counsel's termination.44 The law firm is then required to document
the results of the inquiry and to make them available to lawyers
representing the prospective client.45
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. SEC v. National Student Mktng. Corp., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,027 (D.D.C. 1977).
41. Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26 (D. Md. 1974).
42. Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 241 (1964).
43. SEC v. National Student Mktng. Corp., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,027, at 91,599 (D.D.C. 1977).
44. Id.
45. Id.
This procedure, however, raises a number of questions. First, could
the investigation by the law firm into the reason for termination
result in an infringement on the attorney-client privilege? 46 After all,
former counsel would be required to get a release from the corpora-
tion before he could discuss the circumstances surrounding the ter-
mination. Second, if the former counsel discloses fraudulent activity
by the corporation, will the law firm be compelled to relate that
information to the investing public? Third, because the duty of in-
quiry by White & Case is not part of a court order, how will it be
enforced? Finally, is the settlement a violation of the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, which prohibits an attorney from entering into
a settlement restricting his right to practice?
47
The SEC's policy of disclosure is evident in two recent settlements
against law firms. In SEC v. Petrofunds, Inc.,48 a law firm and a
corporation it represented were charged with violations of the secu-
rities laws by failing to disclose unlawful corporate acts in registra-
tion statements, prospectuses, and other communications. A prelimi-
nary injunction to prohibit future violations against the corporation
was denied.49 However, the SEC continued to seek injunctive action
against the law firm. The law firm stipulated to final orders which
required it to take all reasonable measures to assure itself that full
and fair disclosure of all material facts would be made in documents
filed with the SEC.5"
In In re Plotkin, Yolles, Siegel & Turner,5 1 a law firm was charged
with failing to reveal to client-investors that two of the partners of
the law firm owned common stock in one of the issuers of the securi-
ties. The attorneys involved were prohibited from practicing before
the SEC for eighteen months.
Although these two cases did not directly involve the attorney-
client privilege, they illustrate the relentless enforcement by the SEC
and the effect of noncompliance. The SEC's policy of enforcement
and the effect of noncompliance could coerce the securities lawyer
into violating the privilege.
46. A letter from White & Case to the SEC stated that the procedure would
not be permitted to impair obligations it owed to clients under the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Id. at 91,601.
47. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-108(B).
48. SEC Litigation Release [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L, REP.
(CCH) 95,616 (1976).
49. SEC v. Petrofunds, Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) V 95,621 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
50. SEC v. Petrofunds, Inc., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,098
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
51. Securities Act Release No. 5841, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,236
(1977).
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Securities lawyers who have followed the SEC disclosure policy set
out in the NSMC settlement have gained apparent immunity from
enforcement action. In Meyerhoffer v. Empire Fire & Marine Insur-
ance Co.,52 an attorney became concerned about his excessive fee and
requested that it be noted in a registration statement. On the corpo-
ration's refusal to include the fee statement, the attorney resigned
from the firm and six months later reported the nondisclosure to the
SEC.5 3 The SEC did not file an injunctive action against the attorney
who disclosed the information to it. Although many courts have
noted the harmful effect on the corporate client of revealing confi-
dences, 4 the attorney is allowed to exculpate himself revealing
confidences obtained in the attorney-client relationship.5 5
The SEC takes the position that there must be disclosure of unlaw-
ful conduct which affects the finances of the corporation.5 6 The dis-
closure informs the reasonable investor of the corporation's financial
base.57 The SEC has articulated four standards for materiality re-
quiring disclosure: (1) illegality-for example, a corporation's do-
mestic political contributions are per se material and must be dis-
closed; (2) ethical materiality-that is, where management knew of
or participated in illegal or questionable payments; (3) size of pay-
ments or their relation to a significant amount of business; and (4)
books and records-for example, an alleged falsification of books
and records to conceal unlawful conduct must be disclosed. 8 The
SEC fully intends to use these tests of materiality to force disclosure
by attorneys. 59
52. 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir. 1974).
53. SEC v. Sitomer, Sitomer & Porges, [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 94,184 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
54. Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361 (D. Del. 1975).
55. United States v. Amrep Corp., 418 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Valente v.
Pepsico, 68 F.R.D. 361 (D. Del. 1975).
56. SEC, REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMIUSSION ON QUESTION-
ABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES, submitted to the Sen-
ate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Comm., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976),
reprinted in SEC REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 353 (1976).
57. Address by SEC Chairman Ray Garrett, Jr., Disclosure Rules and New
Concerns, before the American Society of Corporate Securities Insurance (Jan.
16, 1973), quoted in Note, Disclosure of Corporate Payments and Practices:
Conduct Regulation Through the Federal Securities Laws, 43 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 681, 709 n.140 (1977).
58. Note, Disclosure of Corporate Payments and Practices: Conduct Regula-
tion Through the Federal Securities Laws, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 681 (1977).
59. Address by SEC Commissioner Evans, Truth or Consequences, before
the Securities Cooperative Enforcement Conference (May 1975), quoted in Note,
Disclosure of Corporate Payments and Practices: Conduct Regulation
Through the Federal Securities Laws, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 681, 710 n.142
(1977). 807
THE ABA RESPONSE TO THE SEC
Opposition to the SEC disclosure policy has centered on the overall
effects upon the securities lawyer's relation with the corporate client.
The American Bar Association's objection is that allowing dis-
closure would destroy the vital confidences necessary for effective
representation of the client. 60 The increased pressure will cause the
attorney to sacrifice his independent judgment and to act in his own
best interest by making disclosures. 61 The loss of independent judg-
ment by the attorney will be observed by management, and the
corporation will be less likely to heed the attorney's advice or to
share its confidences.
62
Indirect effects of the SEC policy have also been noted. The disclo-
sure policy will encourage private plaintiffs to join corporate counsel
as a defendant. The attorney is then coerced into further breaches of
the attorney-client privilege to exonerate himself.63 Expanding lia-
bility for securities lawyers will increase the expense of representa-
tion because of litigation costs and insurance premiums. 64 Excessive
attorney liability will discourage entry into the field by professionals
and encourage competent securities lawyers to leave. Finally, there is
a fear that the use of the federal securities laws to regulate attorney
conduct will cause the disclosure scheme to collapse of its own
weight as it becomes too unmanageable.
65
There has been a search for guidelines where the SEC disclosure
policy is inadequate or too expansive. One commentator has suggest-
ed that it is the duty of the SEC to establish rules governing the
duties and liabilities of attorneys.6 6 Other commentators have noted
that the guidelines are too important to be left to a governmental
agency hungry for power." Neither the SEC, the ABA, nor the courts
should be allowed to lock the securities lawyer into a detrimental
60. ABA Report to the House of Delegates-Section of Corporation, Bank-
ing and Business Law-Recommendation, 31 Bus. LAW. 544 (1975).
61. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 5.
62. Note, Outside Directors: More Vulnerable Than Ever, 51 I{ARV. Bus. REV.
107 (1973).
63. Note, Disclosure of Client Confidences by Securities Attorney Named as
Defendant in a Civil Action Does Not Violate Code of Professional Respon-
sibility, 29 U. MIAm L. REV. 376 (1975).
64. Myers, The Attorney-Client Relationship and the Code of Professional
Responsibility: Suggested Attorney Liability for Breach of Duty to Disclose
Fraud to the Securities and Exchange Commission, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 1113
(1976).
65. Note, Disclosure of Corporate Payments and Practices: Conduct Regula-
tion Through the Federal Securities Laws, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 681,745 (1977).
66. Shipman, The Need for SEC Rules to Govern the Duties and Civil
Liabilities of Attorneys Under the Federal Securities Statutes, 34 OHIO ST. L.J.
231, 257 (1973).
67. Small, The Lawyer's Responsibility as a Draftsman, 30 Bus. LAW. 81
(spec. issue Mar., 1975).
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position by the use of sweeping generalizations regarding the impor-
tance of the attorney in the disclosure process. 68
The SEC is reluctant to develop specific guidelines for lawyers'
conduct. Such an undertaking would result in voluminous attempts
to cover every possible situation and would lead to further confu-
sion.69 In addition, SEC guidelines may lull the bar into a false sense
of security that compliance gives immunization.7 0 The guidelines
could become a laundry list for prospective plaintiffs to consult in
looking for a defendant to sue. Finally, the SEC guidelines would
arrest the dynamic development in the area of reasoned analysis
based on the particular facts in each case.
71
The ABA maintains that the Code of Professional Responsibility is
the authoritative source for guidance in this area. The Code is now in
force in all states in some form.72 Congress felt that surveillance by
state bar associations was a sufficient guarantee of professional
conduct"3 which should preclude the SEC from establishing separate
professional standards.7 4 After all, the statutes administered by the
SEC grant no power to compel disclosure by attorneys concerning
their clients.71
The ABA's position is that the securities lawyer has neither the
obligation nor the right to make disclosure when any reasonable
doubt exists concerning the client's own obligation of disclosure.
7 6
The client's course of conduct should not be narrowed by an attorney
motivated only by SEC threats of his own liability. The attorney is
bound only by the considerations in the Code in outlining a course of
action to his client. In stockholder suits against the corporation, good
cause should be shown before disclosure, and the court should make
use of in camera proceedings. 77
68. Id. at 85.
69. Sommer, Professional Responsibility: How Did We Get Here?, 30 Bus.
LAW. 95 (spec. issue Mar., 1975).
70. Id. at 99.
71. Id. at 101.
72. See Panel Discussion, Responsibility of Lawyers Advising Management,
30 Bus. LAw. 13 (spec. issue Mar., 1975) (statement of L. Van Dusen, Jr., The ABA
Code of Professional Responsibility).
73. H.R. REP. No. 1141, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1965] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4170.
74. Daley & Karmel, note 6 supra.
75. ABA Report to the House of Delegates-Section of Corporation, Bank-
ing and Business Law-Recommendation, 31 Bus. LAW. 544 (1975).
76. Id.
77. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
974 (1971).
Under certain circumstances, the Code may impose a duty on the
attorney to resign and possibly to disclose; however, the delineation
of these circumstances is a source of controversy. Specific provisions
within the Code give some direction to securities lawyers in deciding
on a course of conduct. A lawyer may reveal communications ob-
tained in confidence to exculpate himself.7 A lawyer is permitted,
not required, to reveal both the intention of a client to commit a
crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime.7 9 Because
only an intentional filing of misleading information is considered
criminal conduct, the attorney would be required to make a finding
to this effect before he would be permitted to make any disclosures.
DR 7-102(B)(1): THE PREFERRED APPROACH
The controversy surrounding the attorney's duty of disclosure and
the attorney-client privilege has focused on Disciplinary Rule 7-
102(B)(1). This Rule provides:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a
fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his
client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to
do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal,
except when the information is protected as a privileged com-
munication.80
Disclosure by the attorney is mandatory if all the elements are pre-
sent. To show the value of this rule in the securities market and its
impact on the attorney-client relationship, a further dissection of the
Rule and a discussion of each element is required.
The attorney is only forced to disclose under the Rule if the infor-
mation is clearly fraudulent or clearly material. If the attorney does
not know that it is fraudulent or material he will be required to make
a judgment.81 The information is material if the reasonable investor
would consider it important in deciding whether to invest.82 The
lawyer should request that the client disclose if in the lawyer's view
it is clear that the matter is of material importance and that there can
be no reasonable doubt that the nondisclosure would be a violation of
the law giving rise to a material claim. 83 If the information is argu-
ably neither material nor fraudulent, there is no duty to disclose.84
78. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 4-101(C)(4).
79. Id., DR 4-101(C)(3).
80. Id., DR 7-102(B)(1).
81. Brakin, The Securities Laws and the Code of Professional Responsibili-
ty, 30 Bus. LAw. 21 (spec. issue Mar., 1975).
82. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
83. ABA [Proposed] Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyer's Responses to
Auditor's Requests for Information, 31 Bus. LAW. 565 (1975).
84. Daley & Karmel, supra note 6, at 755.
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The securities lawyer can urge any permissible construction of law
for his client.8
5
A good faith judgment about the materiality of the information
should not subject the attorney to liability if he is wrong.86 An
attorney is not an insurer of the soundness of his opinion.87 The
attorney is not even liable to his client for a good faith error in
judgment.88 The scienter requirement is consistent with a rule requir-
ing that the fraud be clearly established before imposing upon the
attorney a duty to reveal the fraud.89 A different standard would
subject the securities lawyer to a different and higher standard than
attorneys in other fields.
If the information is clearly material, the violation must also have
occurred during the attorney's representation of the client. If the
attorney learns of a material misrepresentation that occurred prior to
his representation of the corporation, there is no duty to disclose.
Technically, there would have been no fraud perpetrated in the
course of the attorney's representation. The SEC position, however,
is that there is a duty to correct and to reveal the past errors because
a past fraud may still be reflected in a statement and could affect the
market.9 1 One commentator has urged that in such a situation there is
a continuing materiality occurring during the attorney's representa-
tion which requires termination of employment or disclosure.92
The attorney must confront the client with the material informa-
tion or fraud and request disclosure or correction. This step provides
the corporate client the benefit of the lawyer's consultation and
allows the client to rectify errors.
The attorney must reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribun-
al. The SEC is not a tribunal; therefore, the attorney only owes a
85. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-4.
86. Note, The Private Action Against a Securities Fraud Aider and Abettor:
Silent and Inactive Conduct, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1233 (1976).
87. Panel Discussion, supra note 72, at 18 (statement of L. Van Dusen, Jr., The
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility).
88. Daley & Karmel, supra note 6, at 750.
89. Myers, The Attorney-Client Relationship and the Code of Professional
Responsibility: Suggested Attorney Liability for Breach of Duty to Disclose
Fraud to the Securities and Exchange Commission, 44 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1113,
1144 (1976).
90. Id. at 1135.
91. Shipman, The Need for SEC Rulemaking Concerning the Duties and
Civil Liabilities of Attorneys, 30 Bus. LAW. 34 (spec. issue Mar., 1975).
92. Cooney, The SEC's Enforcement Theory, 30 Bus. LAW. 29 (spec. issue
Mar., 1975).
higher duty to the court.93 A disclosure to the court is more likely to
keep the communications confidential and to gain for the client and
for the attorney the benefit of another point of view regarding the
disclosure. The ABA insists that the attorney does not have to accept
the SEC position on materiality and has no duty to inform to this
agency.9
4
There is no duty to reveal if the information is protected as a
privileged communication. This provision was added to the Rule in
1974. 95 If under state law the information is privileged, disclosure is
not required by the Code.9 6 The attorney will have to consult the
statutes in his jurisdiction to find the applicable rule.
DR7-102(B)(1) provides guidelines from which a securities lawyer
can structure an appropriate course of conduct. The Rule sets out a
system of disclosure which protects public investors yet preserves the
attorney-client privilege in critical situations. The Rule also gives the
legislatures of each state the flexibility necessary to define the
conduct which would fall under each privilege.
CONCLUSION
The deceptively simple, startling, and novel proposition that an
attorney has a responsibility to the SEC and to the investing public
for enforcing the securities laws has far-reaching implications.97 An
attorney's duty is to get the best results for his client within the
bounds of the law rather than to bankrupt his client for the sake of
the public investor.9 8 To the extent that the SEC holds an attorney to
a higher duty to the public, it is usurping a judicial function. 9 It
would be anomolous for the SEC to impose a strict liability on
attorneys for their judgments while refusing to accept responsibility
for the issuance of legal opinions of the SEC staff in "no action"
letters.'00
The attorney should neither be protected for his own wrongdoing
nor be held liable when he acts within the bounds of the law to
uphold the best interests of his client. Between these two extremes is
93. Daley & Karmel, supra note 6, at 755.
94. Id., at 757.
95. Panel Discussion, supra note 72, at 17 (statement of L. Van Dusen, Jr., The
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility).
96. Id., at 19.
97. Hershman, Introduction to the Institute, 30 Bus. LAw. 1 (spec. issue Mar.,
1975).
98. Myers, The Attorney-Client Relationship and the Code of Professional
Responsibility: Suggested Attorney Liability for Breach of Duty to Disclose
Fraud to the Securities and Exchange Commission, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 1113,
1130 (1976).
99. Daley & Karmel, supra note 6, at 765.
100. Id., at 812.
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the real world in which the securities lawyer must operate. There are
practical considerations which transcend the boundaries of any one
rule. For example, what is the securities lawyer's responsibility to a
corporate client who has completed a security sale and failed fully to
disclose possible adverse developments, when the security is proving
to be a good investment and the statute of limitations on the original
offering is about to run?'
There are some practices the securities lawyer might consider to
facilitate complete service to the client and yet to limit liability for
himself. The attorney should recognize his own limitations. A
complete mastery of the voluminous securities laws is not expected
by the client. Yet, some attorneys, from pride or from fear of losing
clients, muddle through a transaction and render advice on an issue
on which they are not competent. 10 2 This course of action is a breach
of the attorney's responsibility to the client and may subject both the
attorney and the client to litigation.1 3 Only when the securities
lawyer recognizes his own limitations can he competently identify
material information and determine whether it is protected by the
attorney-client privilege.
In approaching a possible disclosure, the attorney must determine
the areas which need investigation and, if necessary, conduct an
independent inquiry. The attorney should be able ethically to limit
the objective of the inquiry by clear communication with the
client.' If the lawyer discovers information which he feels may be
material, he should urge disclosure.0 5 The attorney must be alert to
the pressures of management and must not serve as a rubber stamp.
The attorney should exercise independent, professional judgment on
behalf of his true client, the corporate entity.10 6 The attorney should
advise how the material information may be disclosed as factually as
possible. In the long run this approach would better serve the client
by minimizing the possibility that the corporation itself will be sued.
The attorney should not allow his name to appear on the disclosure
101. Panel Discussion, supra note 69, at 33 (statement of Donald J. Evans).
102. Id., at 16 (statement of L. Van Dusen, Jr., The ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility).
103. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLITY, DR 6-101(A).
104. Small, The Lawyer's Responsibility as a Draftsman, 30 Bus. LAW. 81
(spec. issue Mar., 1975).
105. Shipman, The Need for SEC Rulemaking Concerning the Duties and
Civil Liabilities of Attorneys, 30 Bus. LAW. 34, 38 (spec. issue Mar., 1975).
106. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 5-18.
document, thus avoiding the impression that he is vouching for the
accuracy of everything in it.'
Even in following the above procedures, the securities lawyer may
find himself defending a suit by stockholders or by the SEC. There
are some practical considerations in defending such a suit. The attor-
ney should urge that the landmark case of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfel-
der'0 8 imposes a strict scienter requirement in SEC injunctive actions
as well as in private claims for damages. Therefore, the good faith of
client and attorney should be an adequate defense. Defense counsel
must insist on and negotiate for less onerous terms of settlement.109
The adverse effects of an injunction should be pointed out to the
court."0 The securities lawyer can either defend against the SEC
injunction or, possibly, settle. Settlement is faster and less expensive
than defending on the merits. However, the settlement becomes the
standard for disclosure and further encroaches on the attorney-client
privilege.
The issues raised in this Comment remain unresolved. A simple
resolution by resorting to any one rule will not provide an adequate
answer. DR 7-102(B)(1) lends some insight into what acceptable at-
torney conduct should be. There are assertions by the SEC and
its opponents that lack proof. The SEC's contention that the
securities lawyer owes a higher duty to the investing public than to
his client is unprecedented and revolutionary."' The only effective
answer that opponents can give to the SEC is that the public interest
in effective law enforcement will be harmed by requiring attorneys to
divulge confidential communication. Unless the legal profession can
convince the courts that maintaining confidences in the attorney-
client relation does in fact have a positive effect on compliance with
the law, the privilege is in danger.
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